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themselves to interpret the law and to locate the relevant provision. In this process, judges use new interpretive techniques and modes of reasoning.
At the present time, fiqh is understood in a legally positivist manner in the judicial setting of Muslim-majority countries. While there is a continuum between classical fiqh and national laws at the substantive level, mainly in the domain of the family, a profound division has developed in terms of methodology and epistemology. This is the heart of our argument. The issue of marriage authentication, a domain in which formal legislation is often silent, provides us with a perspicuous lens through which we examine how what we call 'legal cognition' has been transformed in a radical way.
The article proceeds in four steps. First, we address the institutional and legal transformations affecting law, especially family law, in Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia, focusing on what may be termed a legal revolution that made it possible to speak of law in terms of codes and to classify fiqh as a subsidiary source when legislation is silent. Second, we turn to the specific domain of family law, briefly discussing statute law, case law, and legal practice in each of the three countries. Third, on the basis of marriage authentication cases (ithbāt al-zawāj, ithbāt al-nikāḥ) , we examine how, practically speaking, judges seek a solution in the body of fiqh. Finally, we develop an argument about the nature of judicial work in the management of "references to Islam 1 " within the framework of positive, codified, and standardized law. We argue that the practice surrounding marriage authentication is informed by local social and legal contexts in which the interpretation of fiqh has been influenced by the combined forces of legal homogenization, standardization, and positivization, on the one hand, and the positivistic legal training of judges, on the other.
While there is a degree of continuity at the level of substantive rules, the methodology and epistemology adopted by contemporary judges, the legal material upon which they draw, and 5 the means by which they refer to this material have fundamentally altered the nature of legal cognition (the ways in which people think legally) and thus of law itself.
2) Institutional and legal transformations in Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia
Beginning in the nineteenth century, Muslim-majority countries underwent a major transformation in their political, judicial, and legal administrations. The encounter with the West, mostly colonial, was certainly a major factor in these developments, which led to the creation of nation states, the formulation of positive legal systems, and the establishment of multi-layered judiciaries.
Prior to the establishment of the French and Spanish protectorates in 1912, there were two types of jurisdictions in Morocco: Shra' 2 courts and Makhzen courts. Judges in the Shra' courts applied Islamic fiqh. These judges were generally graduates of the Qarawiyyīn in Fes, were appointed by Sultanic decree (Dahir, ẓahīr), and followed Maliki doctrine. 3 The
Makhzen courts, on the other hand, which initially were confined to penal matters, progressively gained jurisdiction over civil and commercial matters. In this type of court, judgments were issued by administrative governors, bāshās (in towns) and qā'ids (in rural areas).
With the beginning of the French and Spanish protectorate, 4 modern courts were established, although the Makhzen and Shra' courts were maintained. Under the French protectorate, the major and most significant 'reform' of the Moroccan judicial system was achieved through the Dahir of 7 July 1914, followed by the Dahir of 16 May 1930, which transferred jurisdiction over the majority of 'Berber' tribes to customary courts, thus removing them from the jurisdiction of Shra' courts. The so-called 'Berber Dahir' of 1930 triggered a great deal of opposition and may be considered a turning point in the history of the Moroccan national movement. Following the formation of the Egyptian state in the nineteenth century, a centralized and hierarchical legal system was developed with the parallel promulgation of law codes inspired by the French Code Napoléon. Political and legal elites argued that efficient government necessitated a departure from the doctrinal uncertainty that allegedly arose when judges adjudicated on the basis of classical Islamic fiqh (Hasso 2010; Lombardi 2006; Messick 1993, 54; Shaham 2010) . This process of legal rationalization began under the Ottomans, but gained momentum in the nineteenth-century colonial context Lombardi 2006; Shaham, 2010: 104; Vikør, 2005: 228) . By the end of the century, Egypt had "transplanted" (Watson, 1974) European civil, commercial, and penal law codes (Brown, 1997: 10) . As for the judicial system, French-style hierarchical courts were introduced to ensure that judges applied the codified laws consistently. These courts were staffed by judges trained in western-style law schools.
Simultaneously, the jurisdiction of the shari'a courts was restricted to the domain of family law. This does not mean that this jurisdiction was outside the control of the state. Among other things, an 1856 procedural law stipulated that Hanafi rules be applied exclusively in the courts in order to render the application of the law more predictable and uniform. The state also intervened through legislation that required written documentation by a state official for the validation of marriage. The Egyptian state also began to collect statistics on marriages and 7 divorces (Cuno 2015; Hasso, 2010; Vikør, 2005 (Cuno, 2015: 78; Vikør, 2005: 236) . This conception of law contrasted with the corpus of classical fiqh, which, as Peters has observed, is "discursive and include[s] various, often, conflicting opinions"; it is made of "open texts in the sense that they do not offer final solutions" (Peters, 2002: 84) . With the introduction of an appellate system and a new emphasis on documents in judicial procedure, sharīʿa courts became more bureaucratic.
Another important development took place in 1955, when the state abolished sharīʿa courts and transferred their jurisdiction to national courts. At present, the Egyptian judicial system is divided into three branches: an administrative judicial system headed by the State Council; a constitutional judicial system, at the top of which is the Supreme Constitutional Court; and the ordinary judiciary, which has jurisdiction over civil, criminal, and personal status matters (Bernard-Maugiron, 2008: 6) . Hence, Egyptian personal status law is currently implemented by judges who are trained in positive, codified law, and not in traditional fiqh.
Prior to French, British, and Dutch colonization, the region that comprises the modern state of Indonesia was religiously and politically diverse. The Muslim inhabitants of the region generally followed the Shafi'i madhhab, and Shafi'i fiqh was partly applied in some Indonesian sultanates (Ibn Batūtah, 1854, vol. 4: 30, 35) . Matters not governed by Islamic fiqh were subject to local customary practices that varied greatly across the region. During the nineteenth century, Dutch colonization transformed the legal landscape. The Dutch introduced a hierarchically organized system of courts (Lev, 2000: 16, 39) and implemented a number of 8 Dutch codes. 5 Dutch legal policy subjected an important number of matters to custom, and in the process transformed those customs into judicially enforceable 'law', called adatrecht, which later became hukum adat (customary law) (see van Vollenhoven, 1928) .
Upon gaining independence in 1945, Indonesia, unlike many Muslim-majority countries, did not adopt Islam as the state religion and did not make Islamic normativity the source of its law. In a compromise measure designed to avoid alienating non-Muslim groups, the drafters of the Constitution adopted Pancasila (five pillars), 6 stipulating the belief in one unique God (see Bonneff et al., 1980 Darussalam to enact legislation to fully implement shari 'a (Law no. 44/1999 'a (Law no. 44/ , no. 18/2001 'a (Law no. 44/ , and no. 11/2006 ). 
3) Statutes and legislative gaps in family law: marriage authentication
The domain of the family, arguably the last bastion of fiqh, was deeply transformed and reorganized under the influence of positive legislation and state-controlled adjudication.
Statutes or full-fledged codes were adopted and judicial institutions were unified, while legal curricula were created to train jurists, lawyers and judges in one and the same law for all within the borders of the new nation states. The resulting legal upheaval took a very different 9 form in each of the three countries under study for reasons related to their respective precolonial, colonial, and post-colonial history, in addition to the models on which they shaped their legal and judicial systems.
Since the promulgation of the 1957 Personal Status Code (PSC), family law in Morocco has been characterized by its combination of fiqh-inspired and codified law. Drafted by a panel of ten scholars, six of whom were judges, the PSC was intended to be a codification of Maliki doctrine, to which it refers at the end of four of its six books. In 1993, amendments were introduced to the PSC, which were seen by modernists as a breach in the wall. After a long process, the competition between 'modernists' and 'conservatives' led to a royal However, the authority of the state and its ability to regulate marriage continues to be undermined by the survival of the so-called customary marriage (zawāj 'urfī), which is unregistered. Although such a marriage is valid from a religious perspective, no rights or duties arising from it can be enforced in the courts. However, Law no. 1 of 2000 introduced an important change in this regard by allowing a woman to petition the court for a divorce, on the condition that she provides written evidence of her marriage (Dupret 2007b; Berger and Sonneveld 2010: 74; Lindbekk 2013: 91) .
Claims of marriage authentication (ithbāt al-zawāj) are often filed when the marriage contract was not registered, or in cases in which one party denies the existence of marriage.
An analysis of court records indicates that lawsuits over the authentication of marriage are frequently accompanied by a request to establish paternity for children. This finding suggests that the two case types are closely intertwined (see also Ahmed 2012).
In 2004, family courts were established to facilitate the handling of personal status law disputes and to help to resolve disputes amicably. In the wake of the new law, court personnel were provided with computers, with the stated purpose of rationalizing legal practice by making it more uniform. A remarkable feature of contemporary court practice is the widespread use of judgment templates. These templates are not drafted by the Ministry of Justice; rather, they are the product of an informal dialogue within the judiciary on the basis of which family court judges model their rulings on the judgments of other judicial panels.
Judges who were interviewed said that when they were initially appointed to family courts, they spent a great deal of time reading their colleagues' decisions for guidance on how to do their jobs correctly. Consequently, they developed eighteen or so different templates based on the abstract descriptions of cases and rules provided by lawyers at the time of filing law suits, such as marriage authentication (Lindbekk, 2016) . Offering model judgments, such templates facilitate the application of law by helping judges manage their case loads more efficiently.
The use of these templates has created a high degree of uniformity in family courts practices, despite the discretionary power exercised by judges.
Another factor that contributes to judicial predictability in decisions relating to family matters is the legal education and training of judges. Contemporary legal education developed in the nineteenth century in response to the adoption of legal codes and the restructuring of courts (Berger and Sonneveld 2010, 53-54; Wood 2016) . However, although the education of law students largely reflects civil law sentiments, Islamic law and Islamic legal theory are still taught at al-Azhar's Faculty of Shari'a and Law and at other state universities, albeit in a highly circumscribed fashion (Cardinal 2005, 227) . In 2006, 32,000 law students were enrolled in Cairo University's Faculty of Law. The faculty is made up of three sections:
Arabic, French, and English. The tuition fees paid by students enrolled in the French and English sections are higher than those paid by students enrolled in the Arabic section. During the sultanate period (thirteenth to eighteenth centuries), marriage among Muslims in the Indonesian archipelago was regulated by the qadi, mainly applying Shafi'i fiqh, but also local customs and traditional norms. 13 After the beginning of European colonization, in the late 18 th century, there was a shift toward a European-style legal system. With regard to the regulation of marriage, the Dutch Civil Code was applied to Europeans, Japanese, and
Chinese from the first half of the nineteenth century, while 'Orientals' (Arabs, Indians, and Pakistanis, as well as Southeast Asians) were subject to the customary laws of their respective countries of origin (Bedner and van Huis, 2010: 177) . Whereas Indonesian Christians were subject to Dutch government regulation, Indonesian Muslims were subject to Islamic law or customary law (hukum adat).
These regulations were replaced by Law no. 32 of 1954, which applied to all Muslims in Indonesia. The Ministry of Religious Affairs designated thirteen fiqh books to be used as references by religious courts to promote uniformity in decision-making. 14 Until the end of Soekarno's "Old Order" in 1966, the situation remained unaltered, and the registration of marriages, divorces, and reconciliations took place under a pluralistic legal system governing the family. During the "New Order" of Soeharto (1966 Soeharto ( -1998 In sum, Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia have all constructed a legal and judicial system that codifies fiqh in particular ways and specifies the rules judges must apply in the cases referred to them. These systems have also defined the path to be followed in cases in which legislation is silent. They have done so in different ways, according to the specificities of their respective legal histories. However, they share a converging dynamics that results in a common pattern of legal standardization.
4) Marriage authentication: How do judges manage the reference to fiqh?
We now turn to judicial practice in the field of family law when no legislation provides guidelines for the decision-making process. This is the case, to varying degrees, for marriage authentication, which is not subject to any-or only to limited-legislative regulations in the three countries under consideration. In the face of statutory silence, judges are instructed, again to a varying extent, to seek the applicable fiqh provisions. We will examine how they do so, i.e., which methods they use to identify the applicable rules and to legally characterize the facts of the case. the Mi'yār of al-Wansharīsī, the Nawāzil of al-Mahdī al-Wazzānī, and the Nawāzil of alSharīf al-'Alamī (Ghmīja, 2000: 12-13 judges assigned to the appellate court of Fes. In these books, the authors cite from the abovementioned Maliki books, which they relate to the respective provisions of codified laws.
We will now consider two cases that are representative of the actions performed by judges to fill gaps in the legislation: Marriage authentication constitutes one of the main domains in which Egyptian judges invoke fiqh in the absence of formal legislation. Since Egyptian law does not instruct judges on how to identify the proper fiqh rule, courts exercise considerable discretion. In that respect, templates offer a relatively secure guide for issuing the proper solution. Once a judge has made a decision about the legal category to which a case belongs, he or she needs only fill in 20 a few details pertaining to names and dates to produce a ruling. In the case of marriage authentication, a template has been adopted by several judicial panels in different family courts. 21 The following two cases exemplify how Egyptian family court judges use this template:
(1) In the first lawsuit, a female plaintiff filed a petition before the family court of al- The validity of the marriage contract is determined by the following conditions:
1) The offer and acceptance by competent parties within the same sitting;
2) The contracting parties must be able to hear and understand what is said;
3) The acceptance of the offer is specified or implied.
The following conditions are also required for the marriage contract to be valid: October 1998) and it is binding for the guardian (walī) so long as she is married with a dower that is suitable or larger. These works, which are clearly embedded in the civil law tradition, are divided into chapters that follow the sequence of articles in the personal status legislations in chronological order.
Thus, while judges deploy a vocabulary connected to traditional fiqh, the grammar of their legal reasoning is of that of civil law. The widespread use of templates thus tends to reduce
the heterogeneity and open-endedness of fiqh so as to make it available to judges trained in civil law.
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In Indonesia, Here, the court simply applied the KHI without any reference to fiqh. After hearing the testimony of two male witnesses and examining the documentary evidence, the judges listed provisions to be followed for a marriage to be valid. They directly copied the template's formula and pasted it in their decision. ("all marriages shall be registered in accordance with applicable regulations"); and Article 7 of the KHI ("parties may apply to the court for marriage authentication"). The judges borrowed directly from the SIAPDA/SIPP template. They copied its formula and pasted it in the decision.
However, the court considered the statutory texts to be unclear. Thus, it turned to the UCSFT and included a verbatim quotation in the decision to bolster its argument:
Whereas the petition of applicant I and applicant II are in accordance with the arguments contained in the kitab: : wa yuqbalu iqrār al-bāligha al-'āqila bi-l-nikāḥ (the acknowledgment made by a woman who has attained puberty and is in possession of her mental faculties is accepted).
Based on these two Shafi'i fiqh texts, the judges authenticated the marriage. In this case, they used the fiqh and its methods as exposed in the UCSFT. 36 The judges asked the petitioners to prove that the marriage was concluded in the presence of the legal guardian and witnessed by two males. The petitioners brought two female witnesses who confirmed that the marriage had been celebrated by the imam of the mosque, after the authorization of the walī (the father) who was present at the time of the marriage, witnessed by two males, and attended by a large audience.
In family matters, Indonesian Muslim judges base their decisions on positive and codified law. In practice, they use different templates. When the legislation is silent, they also use an uncodified Islamic compilation. As a result, adjudication is standardized, reducing legal uncertainty and transforming the nature of rules and procedures. In Indonesia, the three cases presented here point to the standardization of decisionmaking in the practice of religious courts. The presentation and form of court decisions follow the standard through the SIAPDA/SIPP template and the reference to UCSFT, enabling judges to do their work quickly and efficiently. Judges choose the template appropriate for the case and, to produce their decision, need only complete a form provided on the website of the SIAPDA/SIPP. To fill a gap in the legislation or to clarify an equivocal legal text, judges refer to the non-official compilation of Shafi'i fiqh texts to support their decisions. The UCSFT is composed of citations from Shafi'i fiqh that help judges with a heavy caseload to substantiate their decisions quickly. Consequently, the challenge they face is to find a citation from the USFTC on which they can base their decision. This citation is then pasted into the draft of the ruling.
5) Conclusion
In Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia it is not so much the reference to substantive rules of Islamic fiqh that has disappeared from law as it is the mode of reference to these rules that has substantially changed. As Dupret stated, in his study of Egyptian practice:
The reference to Islam is occasional; moreover, it is always mediated through the use of Egyptian law's primary sources, that is, legislation and case-law.
Henceforth, this reference takes place in the banality and the routine of judge's activity, which consists mainly in legally characterizing the facts submitted to him. By so doing, the judge is obviously more interested in manifesting his ability to judge correctly-according to the standards of his profession, the formal constraints that apply to its exercise, the legal sources on which he relies and the Ibrahim's thesis raises some conceptual problems. While insisting on the upheaval created by codification and on the transformation of processual law into substantive law, Ibrahim might have considered the extent to which this transformation of law constitutes a legal revolution. He fails to do so because this line of thinking would undermine his argument for continuity. In fact, however, his argument is inverted: it is not present-day Islamic law that 32 finds its roots in fiqh, but fiqh that finds an extension in present-day substantive law. In other words, if there is a continuity, it is not that of the concept of law but rather of the substance of rules, which previously were part of fiqh but have been transformed into positive law. The question is obviously not, as Hallaq and Brown (1997: 359) from a means of subjugation to a means of governance. Law was intended to become a 'science', which, like other contemporary sciences, aspired to be all-encompassing, systematic, regular, and mechanical. Enlightenment and Benthamite utilitarianism paved the way for positive law. Linked to a form of social planning, codification served to construct a new order and became the epitome of legal rationalization (Halpérin, 2014: 35) . In this regard, codification diverges substantially from compilation, which does not seek to achieve a new and complete legal order. Although claiming to be continuous with a normative and doctrinal past, new legal codes enacted in the early nineteenth century led to the "substitution of an old legal order by a new one" (id.: 44). A parallel may be drawn between these features of systematization in civil law countries and the evolution, in common-law systems, of the rule of precedents and the publication of law reports (id.: 56). Beyond the systematization of legal rules, judicial institutions were reformed, legal professions were re-organized, and legal education was re-instituted under the monopoly of a new figure: the state. This process accelerated with the growing accessibility of print technology (Rubin, 2011: 89) , and, at the end of the twentieth century, with the digitization of judicial work, which greatly contributed to the homogenization of judicial resources.
Within the framework of codes, rules have the explicit function of providing legal stability.
Arguments for rule-based decision-making traditionally focus on the capacity of rules to foster the interrelated virtues of reliance, predictability, and certainty (Schauer, 1991: 137) .
However, rules are not the only device by which people predict and thus rely on the actions of others. Consequently, the ability of rules to foster more predictability and more justified reliance turns on the simplifying properties of rule-based decisionmaking, on the way in which the commonality of classification and outcome that make reliance possible are more likely present with fewer possible outcomes and fewer and larger classificatory categories. Rules assist reliance by providing this simplification, and also by providing a public categorical designation, such that the likelihood of divergent categorization by enforcer and addressee diminishes when both are looking at the same rule (Schauer, 1991: 139) .
This is a process of double standardization: standardization of rule formulation and standardization of rule interpretation. At the level of rule formulation, the standardization process consists of the insertion of rules into a normative system whose hierarchy is both static -it seeks conformity in terms of content of inferior rules vis-à-vis superior ones -and dynamic -it seeks procedural conformity in the adoption of rules (Troper, 1991: 194) . In positivist theory, rules are part of a system in which their validity depends on other superior substantial and procedural rules. In other words, both form and content are constrained. At the level of rule interpretation, the standardization process consists of generating a similar understanding in different circumstances. It is also shaped by constraints exerted on the range of possible candidates for alternative meaning. Rules have an 'open texture', which, according to Herbert Hart (1961) , means that one can never specify in advance all the possible instances of the application of a rule. However, rules are most often unobstrusive, "doing much of their work without inducing conscious interpretive doubt in their addressees" (Schauer, 1991: 207) .
Rule interpretation is generally a matter of routine. Wittgenstein (1967) speaks of following them 'blindly'. It is even more so the case that rule formulation follows the pattern indicated above: conformity in content and procedure leads to conformity in interpretation. It is only
exceptionally, in what jurisprudence calls 'hard cases,' that rules require any real interpretation. In the case of standardized written rule formulation, there are core meanings from which one does not depart, despite the existence of penumbral cases (Hart, 1961) .
Rules have passed through a process of standardization. For the most part, rules are formulated and interpreted in a standardized manner. Whenever legislation is silent, rule formulation and interpretation are constrained in different ways, e.g., through the precedents of supreme jurisdictions and formal or informal digests of quotations and templates. 38 They all refer to Islamic fiqh, but in a manner that has little to do with the classical method. Does that mean that this is not Islamic law? We contend, in fact, that this question is irrelevant.
Islamic law is not what scholars decide it should be, but what protagonists identify as such (Dupret, 2007a) . There is little doubt that most judges in Morocco, Egypt, and Indonesia hold that the use of templates and precedents does not make the law 'un-Islamic' but, to the contrary, contributes to the tailoring of fiqh to legal modernity. We should reformulate the question: Rather than asking whether something is an instance of Islamic law, we should describe what actual protagonists refer to as Islamic law and how they do so. We need a detailed description of actual practices. Here, it appears that under the cover of similar 35 concepts and designations, the transformation law underwent was radical. Fiqh is now understood through non-fiqhi legal cognition. Through its standardization, it has been positivized.
